Is originalism a morally empty jurisprudence? For decades, various scholars working within the natural-law tradition have argued that the answer is “yes.” To these scholars, because originalism purports to resolve constitutional disputes based on an analysis of the Constitution’s text and history, it implausibly attempts to prescind from making moral judgments or — worse — presupposes a form of moral relativism. Now, Amherst professor emeritus Hadley Arkes — one of the long-standing champions of this critique of originalism — has brought forth an elegantly written book to make the case against originalism and in favor of what he sees as an approach to constitutional adjudication that is more consistent with the natural law.
Book Review: Anchoring Originalism
Anchoring Originalism
Is originalism a morally empty jurisprudence? For decades, various scholars working within the natural-law tradition have argued that the answer is “yes.” To these scholars, because originalism purports to resolve constitutional disputes based on an analysis of the Constitution’s text and history, it implausibly attempts to prescind from making moral judgments or — worse — presupposes a form of moral relativism. Now, Amherst professor emeritus Hadley Arkes — one of the long-standing champions of this critique of originalism — has brought forth an elegantly written book to make the case against originalism and in favor of what he sees as an approach to constitutional adjudication that is more consistent with the natural law.
Read the full book review here.