A Conversation with Justice Elena Kagan Transcript

Dean Payne:

Well, welcome everyone. I’m Stephen Payne. I’m Dean of the Columbus School of Law here at the Catholic University of America. It’s wonderful to see everyone this evening. I welcome and thank in particular the President of our University, Dr. Peter Kilpatrick, and his wife Nancy are with us. Our Provost, Dr. Chris Evans, is with us. Our many wonderful faculty and staff, our Chaplain, Father Aquinas Guilbeau is with us, university chaplain. We have members of our board of visitors and maybe a board of trustees and lots of wonderful community members. I think we have my law school classmate and friend, Father Dominic Legge with us, I think, who is the president of the pontifical faculty across the street at the Dominican House of Studies.

And of course, we have our dear students of whom I’m always so proud, especially for their upholding our fine tradition of treating every guest we invite to great hospitality and respect. So thank you all for coming. Really appreciate it. I’d like to call up Father Guilbeau, if he would, to start the event in prayer.

Father Guilbeau:

Thank you, Dean Payne and Justice Kagan. Welcome. In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Heavenly Father, Creator of all things and Master of all life, You sustain creation by Your mercy, You guide all creatures by Your wisdom. Made in Your image and likeness, we men and women are co-creators with You and cooperators in Your work. We plant and harvest. We teach and enlighten, we order and govern, we legislate and make law. Father, the law that You revealed to Moses was written not only on stone tablets, but also on the human heart, not as an imposition on the will, but as a liberating light to the mind. Your law teaches as it guides, it draws our minds into your truth as it steers our feet toward Your goodness. Your law frees us. Loving Father, as we gather this evening in this school of law, we ask that You bless our university and all who teach and study here. We pray too for our guest, Justice Kagan, and for her family and friends and colleagues. Prosper her work on our nation’s highest court. May her deliberations and judgments secure and promote every citizen’s share in our nation’s common good.

As we continue to celebrate the 250th anniversary of our nation’s founding, may everything we do for family, for church, for state begin with Your inspiration and by Your wise providence reach a happy and perfect conclusion. We ask all this through Christ our Lord. Amen. In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Amen.

Dean Payne:

Thank you, Father Guilbeau. It’s not my job to introduce our special guests, but I welcome Justice Kagan. Thank you so much for coming. It’s really delightful to have you here. I think, you said, for the first time. So welcome. You know, over the past five years, we’ve hosted at our school five justices, Justice Alito, Barrett, Kavanaugh, Thomas, and now Justice Kagan. In other words, we now have a majority of the Court. But unless I’m mistaken, it appears to be a unique majority, one that has not yet existed for a decision by the court of the merits.

Justice Kagan:

You stole my thunder. I thought I’ve never seen that.

Dean Payne:

I’m so sorry. Next time we’ll coordinate. Leave it to us to break new ground in bringing people together. And I hope when that majority finally coalesces, the commentators will give Catholic Law our due credit.

I congratulate the Center for the Constitution and the Catholic Intellectual Tradition. That’s an important mouthful, but it is a mouthful we call CIT on another stellar event. But I also want to recognize the Center for the critical contributions it has made to the law school and the progress of our school. We’ve been on a dramatic rise in recent years, and CIT has been a powerful engine helping to drive that ascent, especially by attracting outstanding people into our orbit. The justices that I just mentioned, many visiting jurists who teach with us, and other judges who come to speak, practicing lawyers, faculty members, and students. Thank you to CIT’s faculty director, Professor Joel Alicea, and to its other directors and fellows, including professors Kevin Walsh, Chad Squitieri, Derek Webb, and Steve Lindsay.

And thank you to CIT’s staff, Carol McHale and Leo Messenger, without whom these events would be much, much more difficult, if not impossible.

Now allow me to introduce you to our inaugural St. Robert Bellarmine Professor of Law, Joel Alicea. He went to Princeton undergrad, to Harvard Law School, just missing Justice Kagan’s deanship there, it sounds like. He clerked with Justice Alito on the Supreme Court and with Judge O’Scanlon on the Ninth Circuit. He has practiced constitutional law with Cooper and Kirk. He’s a non-resident fellow of the American Enterprise Institute. His scholarship focuses on constitutional theory and has been published or is forthcoming in the Yale Law Journal, the Virginia Law Review, the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, and the Notre Dame Law Review, among others. Some of his shorter works have appeared in the New York Times, City Journal, and National Affairs. He was invited to deliver the Bond Lecture at Harvard Law School and was the recipient of the National Federal Society’s Joseph Story Award. He has received several research and teaching awards, including the Professor of the Year from our students. And I do know that one of the most satisfying things for Joel is when students reach out to him about his scholarship, and they have done so from around the country.

I turn the evening over to the St. Robert Bellarmine Professor of Law and the Faculty Director of the Center for the Constitution and the Catholic Intellectual Tradition, Joel Alicea.

Professor Alicea:

Well, thank you, Dean Payne, and thanks to all of you for coming to the highlight event of the year for the Center for the Constitution and the Catholic Intellectual Tradition, or CIT for short. As Dean Payne said, we have opened every year of our existence with an event with a Supreme Court Justice, and we are deeply honored to have Justice Elena Kagan here to continue in that tradition. I tell my students two things about Justice Kagan. First, if you want a model of effective oral argument questioning, listen to Justice Kagan’s questioning at the Supreme Court.

You will hear a justice who has a complete command of all material and who asks respectful, incisive, often devastating questions that really get to the root of the case. There is no justice who’s more effective at oral argument than Justice Kagan. Second, if you’re reading a majority opinion and you know there’s a Justice Kagan dissent that’s coming and you’re feeling pretty persuaded by this majority opinion so far, you think this is going along pretty well, don’t take comfort in that yet because once you get to the Justice Kagan dissent, she will force you to wrestle with the weak points of the majority opinion. She will confront you in clear and concise prose with powerful arguments against whatever the majority has said. And I think a great example of that, Justice, is your dissent in Rucho v. Common Cause. If you don’t mind me saying, I think it’s actually your best dissent and maybe your best opinion as a justice.

And I say that as somebody who agrees with the majority opinion is Rucho v. Common Cause. So it’s a great privilege for all of us here to welcome Justice Kagan to Catholic University. Welcome, Justice.

Justice Kagan:

Thank you so much. It really is a pleasure to be here. I’m delighted to be following in the footsteps of all this distinguished company that you’ve had here and to be questioned by you, Joel. We have a lot in common, actually, when the Dean was going through your resume, it’s like, I went there, I did that. And thank you for those very kind words, which are a lot better than just going through my resume and all of that. But if you could have picked two things to say, I mean, those– incredibly flattering. And I think the way to all said it was there’s “No justice who’s better,” meaning there might be a justice who is as good. And I think that that was your locution. And I will just say that the justice that Joel clerked for, Justice Alito, who I think inaugurated this whole, is definitely as good.

And it could be better. I mean, I think he is a master of questioning, so be to be of questioning to so be to be um complimented on that score by you who worked for him, I mean the only thing that I liked about our Covid era arguments instead of having a sort of free-for-all we went down the row seriatim and um and that meant that you know. When we we did it by seniority so I always went after Justice Alito went the only thing I liked about that mode of argument which was on the whole terrible was that I spent which was on the whole terrible, was that I spoke after Justice Alito and he couldn’t tell everybody what was wrong with me. So, anyway, it’s very flattering. Thank you very much. And as to the dissents, well, thank you, I guess. I would like it if more of them were majorities.

I would like it if, you know, one day some of them just became majorities. But I’ll take the compliment for what it’s worth. Thank you.

Professor Alicea:

Well, I’d like to dive right into some of the most important cases from the last term, and then at the end, we’ll zoom out a bit and ask some kind of bigger picture questions. But I mentioned Rucho just now, and Rucho is one of several cases where you have had dissents relating to election law, broadly understood. So last term, two big ones Louisiana v. Callais and National Republican Senatorial Committee versus Federal Election Commission. The first case changed the way courts will analyze cases under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The second case invalidated a campaign finance regulation that was about political party coordination of contributions with political candidates. And those dissents, as I said, were part of this pattern of election law cases where you’ve written some pretty forceful dissents. So do you think it’s fair to characterize you as having kind of a particular issue fair to characterize you as having kind of a particular interest in kind of the mechanisms of our democratic system, how people come to be elected. And given that you were in the Senate, those three pretty important election cases, do you think that those cases say something broader about maybe methodological or jurisprudential differences you might have with the majority of the Court right now?

Justice Kagan:

Well, on the first, I do think it’s just about the most important thing that the Court does. I mean, if you think about people’s voting rights, they are foundational of every right. I mean, the way any individual person can protect their rights on all other fronts is to be able to go into the ballot box and try to elect candidates who will agree with them about a whole range of matters. So I do think that the voting right for individuals is particularly fundamental. And for our system as a whole, you know, if you basically get democracy down, If you get a well functioning, healthy political system, then you can count on that political system for a wide range of outcomes. You’ve gotten the most important thing accomplished. And there are ways in which the Court will still act as a counter-majoritarian check on the political system.

But for the most part, you know, if the Court helps to get the democratic system right, then it can go of its own. And so it’s kind of foundational that the democratic system be a healthy one. And I have found myself in dissent in this area more than I would like. The decisions that you named are in some respects all very different. They involve different bodies of law and different legal arguments. And I don’t think one would say that there’s a single methodological or substantive disagreement that carries through all of them. I’ll just say a little bit about what each of them is to show that. You know, the first each of them is to show that. The first, the Rucho dissent, I’m glad that the Rucho dissent is your favorite. I think the Rucho dissent of all my dissents is my favorite too, and one that I think is particularly important, and it’s about the capacity of courts to police partisan gerrymandering. And it was really the legal question was, is that question of whether partisan gerrymandering a particular exercise of partisan gerrymandering violates the Constitution. The question was, is that very question distichable?

So it was not, is partisan gerrymandering unconstitutional? The majority assumed that it was, basically said that it was. And the question was only, could courts police that? And the Court said no. And I said, yes, of course, the courts can police it. And it’s important that the courts do so. The second area is the… NRSC case was one of a number that basically set the rules for what kind of campaign finance regulation you can have and how it is or whether it is that the campaign finance system can prevent corruption. And the third, and that’s a First Amendment issue in the way the court thinks about it, it’s like what kinds of campaign finance regulations violate the First Amendment. And then the third, it was mostly a statutory question. It had a bit of a constitutional backdrop, the 15th Amendment’s right to vote, but it was mostly a statutory question about the Voting Rights Act and how we should interpret it and what it allowed and what it didn’t allow. So each of the legal questions were very different. I’m not sure that one could say, oh, there’s a substantive thing that runs through all these or a methodological one.

I will say one thing though. That I do think connects the three majority opinions to their detriment. I mean, you know that I think that in each of the three cases, the Court got it wrong. And I think part of the reason why the Court got it wrong was a kind of lack of the appropriate concern or understanding of the consequences of their decisions. And there are a variety of complicated questions about when judges should think about consequences and when not. But if there’s any place where you should think about consequences, it’s when your mission, really, which is the mission of all of these cases, is to think about, is this you know, is this political system going to operate as intended, as intended by the Constitution and as intended by Congress? And you have to sort of think about well, what’s the effect of this role rather than that role in terms of the way the political system operates?

And I think in each of those three cases, the Court gets that question wrong. I think in the gerrymandering case, the Court, you know, says, oh I think in the gerrymandering case, the Court says, oh, well, this can be done by others. The court doesn’t have to do it. It has its own self-regulatory devices. I think that that’s just been proved wrong, as we’ve seen over the last couple of years, especially where both political parties have been engaged in a race to the bottom in terms of doing these partisan gerrymanders, effectively depriving masses of citizens of their right to voting equality, masses of citizens of their right to voting equality, driving people away from the center, you know, towards the wings. Towards the extremes, because the only thing anybody has to worry about anymore is being primaried, and making what I think is unfortunately a too polarized country even more so, so that, you know, I think in this election and the next election, you know, we’re seeing large states with substantial numbers of people who vote for Republicans, who vote for Democrats. And the states are going to be tried to turn all red, all blue, in a way that I think is very destructive of our democracy.

So that’s one way. I mean, the second, I feel like I’m going on a little bit long here, the second, in terms of campaign finance, the theory of our campaign finance regulations now is that the one place where the court has allowed campaign finance regulation to operate is to prevent quid pro quo corruption, kind of money for favors, and the court never seems to see the opportunities for doing exactly that. So the NRSC case was a case like that, where the Court has said, well, at least so far, that means that it’s okay to put contribution limits.

That it’s okay to put contribution limits onto, you can’t contribute more than X amount of money for a candidate, because if you could contribute an unlimited amount, there would be all kinds of room for political corruption. But the Court doesn’t see how even when you have that rule, if you have a thousand ways to circumvent that rule, which are allowed and cannot be prohibited, then you have that same opportunity for corruption. And I think, you know, the people of America look around this political system and think that all this money chasing all these political candidates is a nightmare, and they’re right.

And the final thing, which was the Voting Rights Act, you know, a big question was, you know, what was this decision going to do in terms of ensuring racial equality and voting and the maintenance of the protections that the Voting Rights Act had set up for, in particular, black political participation, black political representation. That’s why the Voting Rights Act was enacted. That’s why it was amended in the way, in the amendment, in the particular amendment that the Court considered. And the court kind of said, like, oh, well, you know, and it was not clear, like, oh, well, we don’t care if black political representation plummets or, oh, well, we don’t think it would representation plummets, or, oh, well, we don’t think it won’t plummet.

But I think what you saw, like, literally in the few weeks after that decision was announced, was that a large number of southern states decided to redistrict in order to get rid of black districts, which did allow African Americans in the south who create a very large percentage of the southern populace, basically getting rid of their populace, you know. Basically getting rid of their ability to elect representatives of their choice. And the ones that didn’t do it said, well, we’ll do it next time around. So I do think that in all these areas, the Court has kind of blinded itself to the very deleterious effects of their rulings on how the political system works and has created, you know, a democracy that does not work as well as it should.

Professor Alicea:

Well, you said that you thought you were going on long, but actually there’s just so much to say about this. Yeah. This is an enormously important topic. And I asked you about…

Justice Kagan:

I mean, I could go on and on about all… their legal mistakes in these opinions, you know? Like we could have like this about like, you know, how do we know what Congress was doing? And we could have a whole bunch of about the precedents in this area. And if you read my opinions, which are much I’m much better in print than I am in person. If you read my opinions, you’ll see all of that. But opinions, like you’ll see all of that. But, you know, but for just if you think about like what these opinions do, you kind of have an idea of why they’re wrong.

Professor Alicea:

Well, as I said, we could go on on this topic for a long time, but I wanted to make sure to get to another theme of your jurisprudence, which is administratable on separation of powers. And again, another big decision last term in this case, Trump v. Slaughter, where the Supreme Court held that Congress may not restrict the president’s ability to remove principal executive officers for any reason at all, as he wishes, right? You did not write the dissent in Trump v. Slaughter, Justice Sotomayor did, but you wrote the dissent in an earlier case called Seila Law and in some emergency cases that went up to the Court before Trump v. Slaughter and had kind of laid out all the arguments against what the majority did in Trump v. Slaughter, I think it’s fair to say. So you clearly very interested in this topic in particular. Because we have 1L’s in the room, I’m going to just set up what the majority said and then ask for your kind of response on that and to give people a sense of why you thought that this was wrong. So the majority opinion in Trump v. Slaughter is basically based on two core arguments.

One is that the Vesting Clause of Article 2, Article 2, Section 1, vests the executive power in the President, and the Court has said before that that means all the executive power is vested in the president. And the logic that the Court has is saying, well, if the president has the executive power, all of it, then anyone who works in the executive branch is exercising his executive power, the power that’s been vested in him, which means he has the right to withdraw at any point. That’s one argument. The other argument is based on Article 2, Section 3 which gives the president the duty to take care that the law be faithfully executed. And the argument here is, well, how can the president ensure that the law is being faithfully executed as he understands the law if he doesn’t have the ultimate power to remove a subordinate who he doesn’t think is faithfully executing the law? In the case of Trump or Slaughter, that was an FTC commissioner, right? Okay, so those are the arguments from the majority. Again, very similar to arguments that were made at, Seila Law that you disagreed with. So, why do you think the majority is wrong in Trump v. Slaughter?

And more broadly, how do you think that opinion will affect our constitutional structure moving forward?

Justice Kagan:

Yeah. So, you said the Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause. And I think one of the things that I want to say right away is okay, we’re looking at text. Let’s look at another piece of text, which is the Necessary and Proper Clause. And the Necessary and Proper Clause gives and has always been understood by everybody to give Congress the ability to set up executive branch offices, to put those offices in executive branch departments, to decide what those officers will do, to give them responsibility. In other words, Congress has the power under the Constitution by virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause to decide what officers will exist, what those officers will do, how those officers will be structured.

And apparently, I mean, that doesn’t come up in these majority opinions because apparently that is all kind of overthrown by what you said was the Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause. But I think that the Necessary and Proper Clause speaks so much more directly to this issue than the Vesting Clause. For example, which just like executive power shall be vested in the president, it’s a little bit hard to know what that means. It operates in an extremely high level of generality as opposed to the history, the practice, the understanding agreed upon by everybody that it’s Congress that gets to set up the executive branch, except for this one thing, apparently.

And the Take Care Clause, I think, does not really add to the argument. You know, the Take Care Clause speaks in terms of the President’s duty, not in terms of the President’s power. It’s what the President has the obligation to do, not what he has the power to do. And when it says that he has the obligation to take, you know, taking care that the laws shall be faithfully executed, it’s an obligation that pertains to fidelity to law. It’s not but at all a provision that just hands over the president lots of power to do as he wishes. It’s a provision that says to the president, you have an obligation to do what the law commands. So I don’t think that that quite helps the argument. I think if you look at the history, going back to the Founding Era, there have always been pockets of independence that the president can’t muddle in.

There’s a whole academic literature that goes back and forth about how extensive independent agencies were in the Founding Era and going up through the years. But I think basically the newer scholarship and the scholarship that gets it right says in a lot of eras, with respect to a lot of functions there was a great deal more independence than the old unitary executive people understood. And I do think that that too, you said, what will the effects be? I think that the danger of a completely unitary system is the danger of one president being able to ride roughshod over all the other institutions of government and over the people who are supposed to be the sovereign rulers in our democracy. And what the old system, the non-unitary system, did was to make sure that the president was checked, that the Congress could devise a way of structuring government.

And when I say the Congress, of course, the Congress has to get what it does through the president as well. He has to sign it, so he has a say too. But that Congress could create a system of government, governmental structures that don’t allow the president to run roughshod over everybody else.

Professor Alicea:

Yeah, and as you say, this is actually one interesting area in the course of your students where the whole debate seems to be about tax and history. I mean, obviously there’s, there’s important relevant precedents, but your dissent in say law is very focused on what’s the tax, what does the history say? Right? You’ve drawn it off scholarship. There’s another area where scholarship has seemed to play a big role in the court’s decisions. And to that point, actuall,. Trump v. Slaughter cites scholarship of yours. It cites your Harvard Law Review article called “Presidential Administration” that argued for greater presidential—I think this is fair to say, but correct me if you think the characterization is wrong—but argued for greater presidential control over the administrative state, that that could actually promote efficiency and accountability.

At the same time, the article I thought was quite clear in saying Congress ultimately would have the authority to structure the extent of presidential control over the administrative state. You were just saying that where it’s less clear, we should presume that the president has more control, right? Because that would actually be better for a lot of outcomes. But it’s been I bring it up, it’s been 25 years since you wrote that piece, and it’s cited in Trump v. Slaughter. I’m curious now, looking back, knowing what you know now of what’s happened over the last 25 years in our politics and your perspective as a judge rather than as a professor. What are your reflections on that?

Justice Kagan:

Professor Walsh just told me that he worked on that article when he was a student at Harvard Law School. He did a lot of work. I’m sure you’re wrong about that. For one thing, you should have shortened the damn thing. But you’re right. I did write about about very closely connected issues. And, you know, often it’s the case sometimes people cite my articles to me, and I think, yeah, but I’m a judge now. Or, yeah, but it’s been 30 years, and people are entitled to change their mind in 30 years. But I actually think that this one stands up pretty well.

And the reason is this: you were very fair in what you said about this article. Like, sometimes it’s cited, and I have to say, in the way that it was cited in Slaughter, it’s cited to show, oh, Kagan was a presidentialist once, meaning like, what happened, really? But I was a presidentialist of a certain kind. And it was a, the article is really, really super, that an important premise of the argument is that Congress can change this. And Congress has changed it. And Congress can decide where to create pockets of independence from the president. And then the article goes on to say where Congress doesn’t do that, then the president should have greater control over the agencies because then the choice is between a kind of unsupervised bureaucratic apparatus and a presidentially supervised apparatus, which has a great deal more democratic legitimacy and a great deal more connection to what people in our society actually believe and think.

And so as between those two things, yes, I was all in favor of increasing the president’s control over Executive Branch agencies. But the thing was premised, as I said, on the fact that Congress could decide where there was a special need for independence from the president and that indeed that capacity that Congress had functioned as somewhat of a check on the president, right? And like if you do certain things, you kind of dare Congress to act in a way that decreases your ability to control these agencies in the future. So there was, on the one hand, but there was also an on the other hand that was extremely important to the article. And I think both together are right. But that congressional authority to check the president, to control the president to structure administration in the end if it feels that there’s too great presidential control is a quite important one.

Professor Alicea:

Well, that case, of course, was a case about President Trump’s assertion of presidential authority, Trump v. Slaughter, and he won that case. But last turn, he had some significant losses at the court as well, Trump v. Cook, which is about his authority to remove a governor of the Federal Reserve, learning resources case, which is about the statutory authority for his tariff regime, Trump v. Barbara, his executive order over his right citizenship. In all of those, the Court ended up not siding with the president’s position. And you recently said at an event, I’m going to quote you, “Is this Court very conservative? Does it do a bunch of things that are out of the playbook of the conservative of legal movement that I think are deeply wrong. Yes. But is this court kind of a puppet for the current administration? I think definitely not.” So I thought that was very striking that you said this. And I was curious if you wanted to elaborate on that and maybe say something about why you thought it was important to say that publicly.

Justice Kagan:

Yeah. I did think it was important to say because when you pick up the newspapers and get on the internet. You see a lot of this Court just does whatever the president says. And I just think, I think I said in that talk, I think I said it was a bum rap. And I do think it’s a bum rap that there are the, the examples that you gave. I could add a couple more, you know. That the court definitely pushed back on the president when it came to National Guard, the National Guard in cities, and that the court definitely pushed back on the president last year when it came to mail-in voting. So these were all the three that you mentioned. The two that I just added. These were all things that were important presidential priorities. These were not little things on the margin. These were things that President Trump cared deeply about. And so I don’t think it’s fair to say, oh, the Court just – I mean it’s why the president – Sometimes really has not very nice things to say about the Court and its decisions and about some of my particular colleagues. Is because the Court has pushed back. And of course, here I’m talking about the Court, like in general, not any particular justice. But the Court in general in terms of what you can tell from its majority judgments. And so I think that that view of the court is wrong. I do think that there is another half of the statement. Which you also said which I think is also true. This court is deeply conservative. So all the and has accomplished and has pushed forward many things that have long formed part of the conservative legal agenda. So if you think about the things that we’ve just talked about campaign finance regulation and the decision that I dissented from last year is part of a long string of the Court basically getting rid of one after another of campaign finance restrictions. The evisceration of the Voting Rights Act is kind of a longstanding project, you know, that starts in Shelby County, that goes through another aspect of. Which was a Section 5 case. That goes through another aspect of Section 2. This was kind of the third chapter of how to eviscerate an incredibly important act of Congress. The unitary executive. That we talked about. I mean, President Trump likes it, but it wasn’t President Trump’s idea. It was. This goes back to the beginning of President Reagan’s administration really. So this has been a 45 year project. And so I do think in all these ways, the Court is deeply conservative and in that way very different from the Court tha. I joined 16 years ago. You know, the court that I joined was by no means like liberal. Like the Warren Court was a long time ago. But 16 years ago. There was a kind of balance to the court. You, I think, clerked in a year that was sort of the epitome of that balance, which was after the very unfortunate passing of Justice Scalia, it ended up being an eight-person court, which was pretty divided 4:4 on some important issues. And I think that the Court does best. I mean, I look back on that year sometimes. I loved Justice Scalia and I missed and continue to miss him deeply. But I sometimes look back on that eight person year and think there was something incredibly right about that year. Because we couldn’t do too much. And we had to compromise. And we had to listen really hard to each other. And nobody thought, nobody in America thought that the court was in the pocket of any one group or any one party or anyone anything. And the Court had a kind of legitimacy. And when the court has a kind of legitimacy of that kind. It helps to create a stable country. And so I think, you know, look, as an individual judge, you have to do what you think is right. And you can’t sit around going, well, if I vote this way, even though I don’t think it’s right, you know, like somehow you.

I mean it’s just you can’t do that as a judge. But I do think there was a period of time where the Court was in a better place and the country was in a better place because the Court was more balanced. And it was unclear whether the court could push through anybody’s sort of program.

Professor Alicea:

I wonder, would you say the same about the Warren Court though? Yeah, well. When the Warren Court was pushing things pretty far in a direction, a more progressive direction, right? There are a lot of critiques of that, even from the progressive direction, saying that there was a backlash. It went too far right? I wonder what your thoughts are on that period as well.

Justice Kagan:

Yeah, I do think that you could say the same thing about the Warren Court in general, which doesn’t mean that I’m going to, like, you know, throw out every opinion doesn’t mean that I’m going to throw out every opinion of the Warren court. And it doesn’t mean that I think that every opinion was wrong. Basically, the biggest thing that the Warren court did is the one thing that everybody knows you cannot say out loud was wrong, which is Brown v. Board of Education. Which is the most universally accepted opinion in our legal system. But I do think that a lot of this criticism could be levied just as well. And that it did create a backlash. And that it did put the Court at odds with the American public in a way that is not in the long-term interests of either the Court or the country.

Professor Alicea:

Well. We’ve been spending a lot of time on your dissents, but I want to get to a very important majority opinion that you wrote last term in the Fourth Amendment era. The Chatrie v. United States. This is a complicated case. Let me just do a little bit of set up and obviously correct me if I say anything wrong here. But that case concerned whether the government commits a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it attains a person’s location history from Google. Because Google has all these tracking of your location history, or at least at one point it did. If you opt into it. And so you held that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their location information that Google was collecting through the various apps on their smartphones. And in some ways your opinion for the Court is just an application of this 2001 decision in Carpenter v. United States. Which had held that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in people’s cell phone location information. But your opinion says two things I think it might even significantly expand on Carpenter. One is that you say it doesn’t matter if the government is only collecting this location information for a short beer chocolate, two hours. Still a search. And the other is that you say it doesn’t matter that the location history was affirmatively disclosed to the third party, because in this case, you had to affirmatively opt in to this location circus. Right. For Google to be tracking. That doesn’t matter either for it to be a search. So this seems to me like a very significant majority picket in the Fourth Amendment area. Would you mind just explaining how you see Chartrey fitting into the general Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The landscape of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence? But also what do you think the stakes were in light of the change in technology that everyone’s experiencing in this room?

Justice Kagan:

Yeah. So the stakes are, I think, important, but maybe not quite as important as some of you might think listening to that. And the reason is this, is that we dealt with only the first question of the Fourth Amendment which is is it a search? And we said, yes, it is a search. But once you’ve labeled it a search, you’re not saying and therefore it can’t happen. What you’re saying is, and therefore the police need to go get a warrant, or the police needs to have probable cause. You know to show probable cause in some other vein. So it’s not prohibiting law enforcement authorities from doing any of these things. It’s just ensuring that law enforcement authorities are subject to legal standards and can’t do it willy-nilly. Have to show that there’s reason to think that a crime has occurred. And how we answer that question with respect to some of these emerging technologies, which we didn’t do in Chatry and we didn’t do in Carpenter. How we answer that question is going to be of great importance and is really going to decide what the ultimate stakes are in this field. But, you know, I mean these cases are extremely interesting because it’s sort of thinking about the Fourth Amendment in the modern era when there are all kinds of new ways of technologically surveilling things. One of the things. That the opinion in Carpenter did that you referred to, the Carpenter opinion was written by Chief Justice Roberts. And one of the things he did was really to say, you know. The founders were super concerned about the way in which the British government authorities were searching their houses. Were ransacking their possessions. And it’s important in thinking about these issues now that we think about the protections that they wanted, that they demanded then, and to think about how that carries over into the modern sphere. And so he did that in Carpenter. And I tried to do the same thing in Chatry, which was to say this is a protection that if you don’t have it. You’re going to end up in a place where you have a good deal less actual protection, actual control over your own possessions and your own lives than the Founders had back then and the Founders thought was extremely important. You said that the opinion went on from Carpenter. It did. It answered questions that Carpenter didn’t answer. And I think.

Justice Kagan:

That this is just sort of the nature of the judicial process, you know. That constitutional law in our country operates as a kind of common law, that it operates by precedent and that one precedent says something and it lays down a rule and it gives reasons for the rule. And then another case will come up. And that case will have a different fact pattern.

Justice Kagan:

It will be connected, but there will be something new. And you have to figure out okay. How does that precedent lead to the next rule? You know, do these facts, does the, do these facts that have changed. Do they make a difference? Do they not make a difference? And the way you do that is you look to the last rule and you look to the reasons it gave. And you try to figure out what the through line is or whether there is a through line between precedent one and precedent two. And I think that that’s what I tried to do in Chatry.

Professor Alicea:

That raises a question about your jurisprudence more broadly. Because you were earlier criticizing what you were saying was the kind of legal conservatism of this Court. This Court has been much more originalist in its orientation. You’ve been critical of its methodological commitments in some of your dissents. So I’d be curious if you have anything to say about that about originalism as you see it. And any problems with it. But I want to get to the question of, how do you identify yourself in this constitutional theory debate? Because as far as I know, I don’t think you’ve ever said. “I’m a Thayerian,” or whatever. You’ve never really, I think. Labeled yourself in that way as far as I know. I’d be curious to hear do you see yourself as having a particular theory of constitutional adjudication that is a rival to originalism?

Justice Kagan:

Yeah, I’m not sure I have a good one-word label for it, but I guess I would come closest to say that I do view, you know. There is some scholarship about constitutional law as a common law system, common law constitutionalism. And I view myself as in large part doing that. That what I think about when I think about deciding a case is in part the text, but the text doesn’t get you all that far in most constitutional law cases, is in part the history. But we can talk about originalism and why I think that’s not … Well, we could talk about it. But most of all is this special brand of history, which is our Court’s precedent. And trying to make sure that you understand the reasons for that precedent and trying to decide cases in a way that fit within that precedent. It’s not to say. That you can’t ever overrule the precedent. Of course you can. But in large part, that the legal system works best. It works most predictably. It works most fairly. It works most incrementally which I think is a crucial value in the law. That it goes step by step rather than proceed in big jumps and leaps. When you do think of yourself as bound to precedent and what it requires or at least what it suggests about the next case and the next case.

Justice Kagan:

That this is just sort of the nature of the judicial process, you know. That constitutional law in our country operates as a kind of common law, that it operates by precedent and that one precedent says something and it lays down a rule and it gives reasons for the rule. And then another case will come up. And that case will have a different fact pattern.

Justice Kagan:

That it’s not supposed to be leaping around all over the place. There’s supposed to be a kind of stability, which is not to say inertia, because the world changes. The law changes too. But there has to be a kind of stability in our legal system, a kind of predictability, and for and a precedent system is basically also a system of humility. It’s a way of saying. You know, even if I, right now, today, think that they got it wrong. I have to be really super convinced of that because I’ll change it, because I believe deep in my soul in something that might be called the wisdom of the ages. That there’s a wisdom that comes from tradition and history and a long set of practices.

Professor Alicea:

Well, as much as I would like our audience to hear your detailed critiques of originalism–

Justice Kagan:

Can I do a little on originalism?

Professor Alicea:

I would be happy to do it. I was just gonna go by your office hours later and find out why I’m wrong about originalism. ” That there’s a wisdom that comes from tradition and history and along set of practices. But I’m happy to hear you say it.

Justice Kagan:

Can we go over a little bit, just because I’ve done a little bit on originalism?

Professor Alicea:

I’m just happy, if you’re willing to go over a little bit, then I’m happy to.

Justice Kagan:

I am. (Audience laughing) (audience applauding) I guess my punchline on originalism. I’ve never thought originalism really works. But I but, but honestly I think it’s now worse than it used to be so I’ve never thought it works because it often seems that the questions you’re asking are sort of irrelevant to any questions that people really have about modern day practices because it doesn’t really fit with a sense of the outcomes that we actually all accept right now. And this is possibly the most important thing. I said to you, everybody believes in Brown v. Board, including originalists. But the cartwheels that they have to turn to get to a place where they can say Brown v. Board is consistent with originalism are just. You know sometimes they’re almost embarrassing. And I think the same is true for a number of doctrines that we just accept now that the Constitution has a component of sex equality.

Also not an idea that you could find back in 1868. Our understanding of the First Amendment has changed enormously since 1789. If you tried to take the free speech system that they had then and put it in place right now. Nobody would think it bears any resemblance to what we think of as a free speech regime. So there are just ways in which originalism doesn’t work. And I guess, most fundamentally, it’s like, why do we think, why should we be doing this? If the idea is that we should be doing this because our Founders required us to do this. Or wanted us to do this.

I don’t think that they did. They wrote a constitution which has incredibly broad phrasing in terms of all – and this is both in the original version and then in the 14th Amendment which is so much a part of modern constitutional law. They were writing a constitution for the ages. They were writing a constitution knowing that there would be change in the world and knowing that what equal protection meant at one point was going to be different from what equal protection meant at another point. So I think that the whole project is kind of misconceived and it’s not a very good match with the Constitution we have. Which is a Constitution that does not speak in terms of specific practices but that indulges in many hazy generalities. So that’s what I’ve always thought about originalism. Why is it worse? Here’s what was good about originalism. And it really came out of the Warren Court. You know, it came out of the Warren Court because Justice Scalia and Judge, then Judge Scalia and others. Thought that there was no constraint on this judiciary. This judiciary, these judges, they wake up in the morning and they just decide on the basis of their own policy preferences what they want to do that day. And how can that be the right system? And originalism. I mean. It obviously had, there was a recognition that originalism was in general going to promote conservative values. I mean. People weren’t oblivious to that. But there was also like a critically important aspect of the doctrine that was we’re adopting this doctrine to constrain judges because we think judges are doing too much and have and are doing things that really the people and their representatives should do. And the judges should not do. Their representatives should do and the judges should not do. And that’s a critical point. And that’s always been the best thing about originalism is that it’s held that value up to the American people. That there should be constraints on judges and the judges should feel some self restraint. And I think that originalism just, you know. There were always ways in which you could criticize the originalist project because it was hard to figure out. What the right answer was. And maybe it wasn’t as restrained as Judge/ Justice Scalia thought. But I think that that’s gone sort of way overboard now. And I think that the reason is basically everybody now on the conservative side of the spectrum has to identify themselves as an originalist. It used to be kind of a choice. You could be an originalist or you could be some other kind of judicial conservative. But now everybody has to be an originalist. That’s part of the thing. And that means that there’s a very big tent, which is, big tents are good for some things, but possibly not for the coherence of judicial theories. And I think that because there are so many people under this tent it’s created a world of things that used to be clear and now are not clear. So what are we looking to? It used to be you looked to just the original meaning of, you know, whatever amendment you were you were dealing with whether it was the first or some structural provision or the 14th. And you looked to one point in time and said, what’s the original meaning of that? And now there are a lot of people. They look to lots of points in time. It’s like history and tradition, and it’s not about the original meaning at one moment. So there’s one question, it’s like. What do you look to? There’s another question, which is. What are you looking for at whatever period you look for? Are you looking for a specific rule or practice? That used to be kind of the idea. Or are you looking more for a principle that then you could derive different ideas from? So the way I sort of think about this now is that I never know whether the court is going to be trapping something in amber these days or not trapping something in amber. So this is the thing that the court constantly says, but we’re not trapped in amber, or sometimes we are trapped in amber. And it’s just really hard to tell when the whole project is about trapping things in amber. Or whether those same originalists say we’re not trapping things in amber, we’re just deriving the general principle, and then we’ll do other things with it. And then, like, finally, I’m very confused, honestly, about the role of values and originalism these days. Like, the whole idea of originalism in the beginning. Was trying to get values out of the picture. And everybody knew that was sort of impossible. But that was the ideal. And now it’s like, no, values are pretty much part of the project, at least for some people. And, you know, how and why and how that relates to the bigger project seems very unclear to me.

But they’re back. And so it just seems to me that that originalism. And you can tell me why I’m wrong, I’d be really interested, if you’d tell me. But that originalism now, it’s like bigger, but that it’s less coherent, and most importantly. It’s given up what I always thought was best about it which is the insistence upon constraint and the insistence upon a limited role for judges.

Professor Alicea:

May I?

Justice Kagan:

Yes.

Professor Alicea:

Because progressive constitutional theory is constrained and coherent and doesn’t allow values to come in.

Justice Kagan:

No. I agree with you completely.

Professor Alicea:

I think that here we come back to Justice Scalia’s famous point, right? The lesser of two evils.

Justice Kagan:

Do we even know the bear story? Oh. No. But yeah. But, yeah. Justice Scalia always used to say, so there’s a bear in the woods and two people, two campers, and one of them starts to run and the other one says, “Don’t you know you can’t outrun a bear?” And the other one says, “I don’t have to outrun the bear, I just have to outrun you.”

Professor Alicea:

Yes. And so, very briefly on this point you can say well how about you?

Justice Kagan:

So, this is a fair point. You could say, “How about you?”

Professor Alicea:

Yeah just very briefly and then I do want to get to some other points before we conclude but on and then I do want to get to some other points before we conclude. But I mean, one example that you gave, just to make it more concrete, equal protection, right? Where you say, well, look, this was understood to be expansive so that it could change over time. But it seems like when you don’t have an originalist method, it’s the judges who are deciding how this changes over time.

Justice Kagan:

No, I take the point. This is the challenge for all judges. And as I said, this was always the good aspect of originalism, that it confronted that challenge. It understood that challenge, and at a time when some judges didn’t understand that challenge, and maybe this is a time where still some judges don’t understand that challenge, but it insisted that this was like part of what it meant to define the judicial role and to create a theory of constitutional interpretation that would pull judges back from the brink. And I do think that that’s an important goal. And I think that both conservatives and liberals have violated it. And, you know, when you say, well, how about you? I totally accept that point. The question is, how are we to do it now? Is it through originalism or is it through some other mechanism of controls and limits and making sure judges. Can do what they ought to be doing while making sure they’re not doing what they oughtn’t to be doing, I think that there are better techniques.

Professor Alicea:

Well, I’m going to go a little bit over, as you said, on to a couple more questions.

Justice Kagan:

Okay.

Professor Alicea:

Thank you for indulging us. But one area where you have sometimes disagreed with your fellow non-originalists on the Court is religious liberty, right? You’ve sided with religious liberty claimants in a number of important cases, Trinity Lutheran, which is about discrimination against religious groups seeking public benefits, Our Lady of Guadalupe, which is about religious groups having control over who are their own ministers, religious institutions, Masterpiece Cake Shop, a baker who didn’t want to bake a same sex wedding cake, and American Legion. This is a case about the Bradensburg Cross being on public land. In all of those, you side with the religious liberty claimant.

So, how do you think about the distinctive protections that are given to religion in our constitution? Seems like an appropriate question, since we’re a religious institution.

Justice Kagan:

Yeah. So I think that there’s not a single thread that unites my views in those cases. Some are free exercise places. Some are establishment places. So I’m not going to try to tell you what the unifying theory of those four is. But I will say– I mean, I don’t disagree with you that there are times when I have been at odds with some of the people that I usually travel with and have joined opinions which are, you know, I think all of those opinions were written by conservative members of the Court who I’m happy to join at times. And in those opinions, I would not take back a single one of those votes. I think all of those votes were right. I mean, religious liberty is an incredibly important value of this country. People from the very beginnings of this country came to this country for that reason, to be able to practice religion in the way they chose.

That has a long history. It includes my ancestors. My ancestors came to this country in large parts so that they could practice religion without fear, without violence, without being considered a second-class citizen. I mean, it’s a magnificent gift of this country that people can pray in the way they want to pray and be every bit as American as other people who pray the way they want to pray. And I mean, I think we should glory in that heritage. And I guess the way I think about this in law is that the dominant principle. Is something about a norm of religious equality that every American citizen, no matter how they worship, whether they worship, but no matter how they worship, is as much an American citizen entitled to the same privileges as every other American citizen. And that’s a crucially important part of our nation’s history. You didn’t mention one decision, which I will say is, the decision that I think most people think about me when they think about religion, which is a decision called Town of Greece, where I wrote a dissent. And the question in Town of Greece was whether at a town meeting, which was held every week or every two weeks or something like that, and it was a small town and they had a meeting every week where citizens could show up and petition the town council. For various benefits or just state their opinions. And so it was very much sort of like a New England town meeting kind of structure. And this was an entirely Christian community. And I am not remembering what kind of Christian, but it was an entirely Christian community, and the prayers were entirely Christian prayers. And that meant that the very few people. But the people who were not Christian, whether they were Jewish or Muslim or just non-religious entirely, that when they showed up to the town council, they too listened and were sort of the captive audience, if you will, of these extremely, not just kind of, you know, thank you kind of prayers, but pretty religious in content prayers. And the question was whether that was permissible under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. And my colleagues wrote an opinion, and it’s a very respectful opinion by Justice Kennedy, who is very sensitive to concerns like this and wanted to write a sensitive opinion, but he basically just said, well, this has been going on for a long time, and there’s a clear tradition in this country of religious prayer at governmental meeting houses, like look at Congress and look at your state house.

And we’re not going to get into the business of deciding what kind of prayers are allowed and what kind of prayers are not allowed. And my dissent was kind of, well, that’s just not good enough. That if you go to a town meeting and one after another there is the exact same sectarian kind of religious prayer that nobody who does not share in that religious tradition can truly feel as though they are a citizen on the exact same level as other citizens in that town. That that town is sending a message about who is included and who is excluded, what it means to be a citizen of that place. And I close with this dialogue between George Washington and a member of a very, very early Jewish community in Rhode Island, where they talk about what it means to have a tradition of what religious liberty it means.

And the two basically say to each other it means that no matter how we think about religion, no matter how we pray, that we are a single national community. And for me, that is the dominant message of the First Amendment and the one that I think explains those joins, but also explains that dissent.

Professor Alicea:

Well, let’s make this the last question then. This is a university where people feel comfortable talking about faith and the personal religious experiences. So, if you don’t mind me asking just a personal question, having nothing to do with the decisions you make in cases, just to get a better sense of you personally, what role did religion play in your upbringing, if any, and does it still play a role in your life now?

Justice Kagan:

Important and important are the two one word answers to that. So, I grew up in a Jewish household. I went to Hebrew school twice a week after school. I always went to Saturday services, Shabbat services. So it was a big part of the time commitment of my childhood. I think if anybody knows anything about my childhood, I don’t have a very interesting life story like some of my colleagues do. But if anybody knows anything, they know. The only thing that I would say. That the press ever found interesting about my childhood, when I was nominated for these positions, the only thing they ever wrote about was I was at the age of 13 when boys in the Jewish tradition get bar mitzvahed. I and my family attended an Orthodox synagogue, a highly observant synagogue that did not have a tradition of doing the same thing for girls. And my own theory of life at the age of 13 or 12 or 11, I had an older brother, and my own theory of life was that I had to be able to do everything he did. And so it struck me as deeply wrong. And so I engaged in incredibly constructive dialogue with my modern Orthodox rabbi about how we could create an analog, I would say, not a match, but an analog of a bar mitzvah foreman.

Justice Kagan:

So I think when I think back about my childhood, actually, this is possibly the most important thing that ever happened to me was going toe to toe with my Orthodox rabbi and coming out with a partial win and understanding that partial wins were sometimes fine.

Justice Kagan:

But thinking about how religious traditions change, too. So that was my childhood. My Judaism, my Jewishness continues to be important to me. I love the Jewish holidays. I love Shabbat dinners. I go to a wonderful synagogue here in town, which, which to me I love because it combines deep erudition. Judaism is a very text-based religion.

There’s lots of stuff to study and interpret and think about. It’s very, very lawyerly. But it combines that with a lot of warmth and joy. And I read Jewish history. I think about Jewish culture. So it remains an important part of who I think I am and where I come from.

Professor Alicea:

Two things before we close. First, there’s a reception afterwards that you’re all invited to. And we ask you to remain seated until the Justice exits the auditorium. Now please join me in thanking Justice Kagan.

A Conversation with Justice Elena Kagan Transcript